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“You already have zero privacy. 
Get over it!”1 Would Warren and 
Brandeis Argue for Privacy for 
Social Networking? 
 
Connie Davis Powell* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Internet and new technologies, like social networks,2 
have changed the manner in which members of society interact 
with one another. Users of that technology are able to provide 
up-to-date commentary about the details of their daily activity 
from their smart-phones, Blackberry or iPhone, to name a few. 
While social networks provide access to unprecedented 
amounts of information and a new medium of communication, 
they nevertheless provide challenges to the application of laws 
that have traditionally governed in the brick and mortar world; 
particularly, the application of privacy laws. In 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis penned one of the most influential 
 
1. Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, Inc. has been attributed 
this quote. Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal 
Info. What‟s in It for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84. 
* Connie Powell is an Assistant Professor of Law at Baylor University 
School of Law. Professor Powell received her J.D. from Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law in Bloomington, Indiana and A.B. from the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor Powell would like to thank her 
research assistants, Akilah Craig and Annette Nelson, for their work on this 
project. 
2. Social networks are online communication platforms which enable 
individuals to join and create networks of users. Usually, these services 
require the creation of profiles by users, in order for others to view and to 
provide invitations to join various networks and groups. Well-known 
examples include Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. For a more detailed 
description of social networks, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social 
Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated 
Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741 (2008). 
1
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law journal articles, The Right to Privacy,3 out of mere 
frustration with new technology and journalists‟ increasing 
ability to intrude upon the private lives of individuals.4 Warren 
and Brandeis wrote: 
 
That the individual shall have full protection in 
person and in property is a principle as old as the 
common law; but it has been found necessary 
from time to time to define anew the exact 
nature and extent of such protection. Political, 
social, and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law, 
in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands 
of society.5 
 
Much like Warren and Brandeis, this Article is written out 
of exasperation with the ever-changing privacy policies of social 
networking sites. Indeed, a Wall Street Journal article exposed 
yet another instance where social networks have made 
disclosures of personal information not in compliance with 
posted privacy policies by social networks.6 As more of these 
instances occur, they become indicators that the current self-
regulatory regime of contracts between the social networking 
sites and its users via privacy policy is insufficient to protect 
the interests of the users. 
This Article ambitiously applies the arguments made in 
The Right to Privacy to advocate for expansion of the public 
disclosure of private facts tort. Part II describes the basic 
arguments made by Warren and Brandeis in The Right to 
Privacy to support their contention that technology created a 
harm that was incapable of being addressed by the remedies 
available at the time. While Warren and Brandeis focused on 
 
3. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
4. Id. at 196-97. 
5. Id. at 193. 
6. Emily Steel & Jessica Vascellaro, Sites Confront Privacy Loopholes, 
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2010, at B1 (discussing various social networks practices 
of sending its users‟ data to advertiser which would enable the advertisers to 
discern personal identifiable information about individuals). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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sensational journalism coupled with photography, the premise 
of The Right to Privacy was that the law generally should 
recognize the “right to be let alone.”7 Part III further 
summarizes Warren and Brandeis‟ development of their basic 
premise and discusses how the authors‟ arguments laid the 
foundation for courts to use The Right to Privacy as “precedent” 
to find a “right to be let alone” in a variety of factual situations, 
as well as setting the stage for the courts to impose a variety of 
remedies for violations of the new right to privacy. Part IV 
discusses the obstacles the authors had to overcome as they set 
out their legal concept for which no precedent existed. Part V 
summarizes the evolution that occurred in the wake of Warren 
and Brandeis‟ article which ultimately lead to the development 
of today‟s privacy torts. Part VI outlines the privacy issues 
presented with the use of social networks, such as Facebook 
and MySpace. Part VII advocates for courts to recognize the 
right of privacy in information posted on social networks and to 
expand the public disclosure of private facts tort to include this 
information. The Article concludes with a plea comprised of the 
text of The Right to Privacy with reference to social networking 
and the inefficiency of self regulation. 
 
II. The Right to Privacy: A Plea for Privacy in the Midst of 
Nineteenth Century Technology 
 
Gossip! Incredulous gossip, documented with photography, 
publicized and commercialized, was the source of frustration 
for Warren and Brandeis.8 The introduction of “[i]nstantaneous 
 
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 205. 
8. There is much debate about the impetus leading to Warren and 
Brandeis penning The Right to Privacy. Prosser reveals in his 1960 article 
Privacy that the motivation was the publicity given to the wedding of 
Warren‟s daughter. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Others 
suggest that the true inspiration for the article was events in the media that 
had garnered much attention relating to yellow journalism and surreptitious 
photography. See David Leebron, The Right to Privacy‟s Place in the 
Intellectual History of Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. 769 (1991); Barron, Warren 
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890): 
Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 891-94 
(1979). 
3
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photographs and newspaper enterprise[s],”9 were the 
technological advances of society that demanded 
acknowledgment in the common law by Warren and Brandeis. 
This technology, according to the authors, enabled invasion of 
the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life,”10 with ease. 
Warren and Brandeis bemoan that: 
 
The press is overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of 
the vicious, but has become a trade, which is 
pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To 
satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual 
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of 
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column 
upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can 
only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic 
circle.11 
 
The ability to mass produce newspapers, coupled with the 
intrusive nature of photographers, according to the authors, 
required recognition of the private individual‟s right to control 
the circulation of information pertaining to her private 
affairs.12 The authors asserted that the right to one‟s image for 
years had been observed as an area to which a legal remedy 
was needed.13 Expounding upon this basic observation, Warren 
and Brandeis advocated for the protection from the 
unauthorized circulation of photography, and protection 
against the invasion into the private affairs of individuals, and 
the subsequent publication and profit from such invasions. In 
order to provide for such protections, it became necessary for 
the authors to classify the injury occasioned by the technology. 
Two classifications of injuries—”mental pain and distress” and 
the perversion of morality—were advanced by Warren and 
 
9. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 196. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 195. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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Brandeis.14 The authors argued that these injuries were not 
adequately protected and could not be protected with the 
remedies available. In advancing this basic argument, Warren 
and Brandeis first sought to differentiate between the harm 
addressed under defamation law and the harm caused by 
widespread commercial gossip.15 While the harm seemingly 
resembled that which was protected by the law of defamation—
slander and libel—when one delved deeper into the harm that 
was addressed by defamation law, damage to reputation, it was 
clear, according to the authors, that the “right to be let alone” 
differed from the protection against damage to reputation in 
the community.16 According to Warren and Brandeis, the law 
did not recognize a cause of action based upon injured feelings. 
The “right to be let alone” is a mental state, not associated with 
outside interactions but rather with internal feelings.17 
Looking to the existing cause of action for breach of 
implied contract, trust or confidence, Warren and Brandeis 
discussed two English cases which provided remedies to 
plaintiffs whose photographs were used for commercial 
purposes without authorization.18 In each case, relief was 
granted to the plaintiff. Warren and Brandeis wrote that the 
protection under contract theories for the use of photographs 
taken at the behest of an individual, which is used by the 
photographer for her own commercial purposes, did not 
adequately protect the individual in light of the technological 
advancements. In each of the cases discussed, there was a 
relationship with the photographer and the plaintiff. 
Technology, Warren and Brandeis explained, provided the 
ability of photographers to take pictures instantaneously and 
surreptitiously. The authors pointed to Justice North‟s question 
in Pollard v. Photographic Co, whether the plaintiff‟s counsel 
 
14. Id. at 196. 
15. Id. at 197. 
16. Id. at 197-98. 
17. This proposition that the law at the time did not provide a remedy 
for a mental state is disingenuous at best, because of the cause of assault, 
which clearly addressed the feeling “fright.” Warren and Brandeis relegated 
the discussion of this contradiction to a footnote, and moved on to the next 
distinction. Id. at 197 n.1. 
18. Id. at 208-10 (discussing Tuck v. Priester, (1887) 19 Q.B. 639 (Eng.) 
and Pollard v. Photographic Co., (1888) 40 Ch. 345 (Eng.)). 
5
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agreed that no cause of action would exist if defendant had 
“taken [the photographs] on the sly.”19 Indeed, it was 
acknowledged that in the case as referenced by the Justice, no 
trust or consideration existed to support any contract claim.20 
Further, Warren and Brandeis contended that contract law 
provided a remedy that “satisfied the demands of society at a 
time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have 
arisen without violating a contract or a special confidence.”21 
The authors continued, however, that technological advances 
“afforded abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such 
wrongs without any participation by the injured party.”22 As 
such, Warren and Brandeis strongly urged that the courts 
adjust the law, as it is the nature of common law to protect its 
citizens from the harms that are occasioned by new technology 
through the recognition of courts of the necessity to further 
advance the laws.23 
 
III. Grounding a Right of Privacy in Common Law 
 
Having set forth the harms occasioned by the technology 
and demonstrated the insufficiency of the causes of action 
available at the time, Warren and Brandeis did not make a call 
for revisions to the then current legal regime. Instead, Warren 
and Brandeis argued that while defamation, intellectual 
property, and contract theories were undoubtedly inadequate 
to address the “harms” caused by the use and availability of 
new technology, the basis for these causes of actions 
nevertheless provided a solution to the problem. The authors 
argued that rooted in the existing case decisions was a broader 
principle, the “right to privacy,” which required separate 
 
19. Id. at 208 (quoting Pollard, 40 Ch. 345). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 210-11. 
22. Id. at 211. 
23. Benjamin Bratman points out that privacy protection in the 
nineteenth century “fell short of constituting a meaningful „right to privacy.‟” 
Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren‟s The Right to Privacy and the 
Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 633 (2002) (describing the 
challenges that Warren and Brandeis faced in establishing the protection of 
psychological injury). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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recognition. It is important to note that Warren and Brandeis 
did not purport to establish a new body of law,24 but rather 
sought for the courts to recognize the underlying principle that 
formed the basis of many decisions made by the judiciary and 
then expand existing law to encompass this underlying 
principle. Most notably, it was recognition by the courts of this 
“right to privacy” that Warren and Brandeis sought. 
Warren and Brandeis acknowledged that while the 
common law has always protected person and property, the law 
first only gave recognition to “physical interference with life 
and property.”25 To truly ground this principle, Warren and 
Brandeis focused on the development of the “right to life” and 
“right to property” simultaneously. The right to life in its 
simplest form, according to Warren and Brandeis, was the 
protection of “thoughts, emotions and sensations” and was 
embedded in the protections afforded to many concepts of 
property.26 Only part of the satisfaction of “life” rests in 
physical things.27 As such, the development of law through the 
common law “enabled the judges to afford the requisite 
protection, without the interposition of the legislature.”28 
The authors cited a number of English cases which 
prevented the unauthorized publication of intellectual or 
artistic property of another.29 These cases, according to the 
authors, were illustrative of the premise that the law as it 
existed created a legal fiction—property rights which afforded 
protection “to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed 
through the medium of writings or of the arts.”30 In order to 
maintain this legal fiction upon which the protection of 
intellectual property was based, Warren and Brandeis wrote 
that the law should protect against the seizing of facts about a 
 
24. The Warren and Brandeis article The Right to Privacy is most noted 
for establishing the basis of the four basic privacy torts—intrusion upon 
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and appropriation of 
name or likeness. 
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 193. 
26. Id. at 195. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 204-05. 
30. Id. at 205. 
7
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person‟s private life by gossip mongers.31 Without a doubt, 
these facts could be classified as “property” belonging to the 
individual.32 Recognition of the right to privacy, they argued, 
was merely advancing the foundations previously established.33 
Next, Warren and Brandeis focused on the extension of 
tort law to protect the harms established. They argued that 
tort law provided the best remedy to combat the harms of the 
new technology. Indeed, it was tort scholar Judge Thomas 
Cooley‟s coined term “the right . . . to be let alone”34 that 
resonated throughout the article. Warren and Brandeis 
painstakingly developed a proposal for tort extension which 
would address the harm created by the technology and the 
business practices of journalists.35 The proposal for protection 
 
31. Id. at 204-05. 
32. Id. 
33. This proposition made by Warren and Brandeis was the first 
amongst many law review articles that agreed with this basic premise. See, 
e.g., Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4. S.D. L. REV. 
1 (1959); Gerald Dickler, The Right of Privacy: A Proposed Redefinition, 70 
U.S. L. REV. 435 (1936); Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 
(1932); Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 
COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Basil W. Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 B.U. 
L. REV. 353 (1932); Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 
694 (1912); Frederick J. Ludwig, “Peace of Mind” in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform 
Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734 (1948); Louis Nizer, The Right of 
Privacy: A Half Century‟s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941); William 
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); George Ragland, The Right 
of Privacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85 (1929); Percy H. Winfield, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REV. 23 
(1931); Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and 
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (1952); The Right to Privacy in 
Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892 (1981). 
34. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 
1888). 
35. It is important to note at this juncture that Warren and Brandeis did 
not seem interested in a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, as there 
was a recent case, DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), in which an 
individual who was not a physician and had no other imperative duties was 
permitted to be present while a woman gave birth. The court took a notable 
step towards recognizing a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion in 
holding: 
 
To the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one and no 
one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some 
real and pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed 
in this case. The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of 
her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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of a right to privacy36 was to repress the publication of matters 
“which concern the private life, habit, acts, and relations of an 
individual” which have no legitimate public concern.37 Warren 
and Brandeis stressed that the aforementioned list was not 
intended to be exhaustive, but rather intended to provide a 
class of matters that should be considered.38 Because the 
matter involved publication and the press, the authors thought 
it imperative that there be parameters placed upon this 
particular tort. Their proposal allowed the press to print 
matters that were of legitimate public concern; did not prevent 
the disclosure of private facts that would be held in confidence 
and were subject to privileges; and the tort would cease if the 
matters were made public by the individual.39 Under the 
Warren and Brandeis tort proposal, truth would not be a 
defense to a claim, nor would a malice standard be applied.40 
This proposal, according to Warren and Brandeis, was aligned 
with the current theories that shaped the foundations of the 
law as it existed. Application of the proposal by the courts 
would be a continued development of the common law to 
address the ever-changing needs of society based upon the 
introduction of technology, the change in values, and 
conventions. The law, argued Warren and Brandeis, must be 
adaptable. 
 
IV. The Hurdles that Warren and Brandeis Had to Jump 
 
While the laws of the nineteenth century afforded limited 
protection of concepts of privacy,41 these protections, as argued 
 
this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain 
from its violation. 
 
Id. at 149. 
36. While Warren and Brandeis seemingly argue for this broad 
protection for privacy, the crux of their proposal was to address publication of 
private affairs. 
37. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 216. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 216-18. 
40. Id. at 218-19. 
41. The protections of privacy in the nineteenth century included: libel; 
Fourth Amendment protections of the home, private papers and mail; 
9
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by Warren and Brandeis, fell short of providing an expressed or 
meaningful “right to privacy.” Courts in 1890 provided 
remedies only if one could establish elements of the recognized 
causes of action.42 Outside of these causes of action, only those 
violations which could be tied to a property right or classified 
as a violation of a property right were afforded a remedy. Thus, 
the proposal set forth by Warren and Brandeis was a leap for 
any court to follow.43 First, there was clearly no case precedent 
cited for the propositions posited by the authors. Second, the 
idea that one could be compensated for psychological injury 
absent a showing of physical, reputational, or property harm 
was contrary to traditional concepts.44 Undoubtedly, the 
societal sentiment at the time was that the invasion of privacy 
protected the home and the privacy associated with it.45 
Warren and Brandeis themselves recognized that courts had to 
be willing to accept the notion that protections afforded by the 
law at the time were based upon the right to privacy, even 
when the law did not provide damages for emotional harms. 
The third and the highest hurdle that presented itself with 
respect to the Warren and Brandeis proposal was the First 
Amendment. The freedom of the press clause of the First 
 
trespass, criminal eavesdropping and restrictions on the publication of 
private letters. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3. 
42. See id. 
43. Contemporary scholars also noted the shortcomings of Warren and 
Brandeis‟ appeal in The Right to Privacy. Professor Davis argued “that the 
concept of a right of privacy was never required in the first place, and that its 
whole history is an illustration of how well-meaning but impatient 
academicians can upset the normal development of the law by pushing it too 
hard.” Davis, supra note 33, at 23. Prominent scholar Harry Kalven argued 
that Warren and Brandeis failed to outline the requirements for the very 
cause of action they were advocating. Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law—
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 330-31 
(1966). And, Pratt boldly commented “that Warren and Brandeis were wrong 
and that their argument was not supported by their own evidence.” Walter F. 
Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PUB. 
L. 161, 162. 
44. See Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) 
(discussing that no law prevented the use of the deceased‟s name on cigars, so 
long as it did not involve libel, and rejecting arguments made by Warren and 
Brandeis for a right to privacy). 
45. For a concise overview of the privacy rights and nineteenth century 
sentiments regarding privacy, see Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth 
Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892 (1981). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of . . . the press.”46 The very essence of 
their proposal was to curtail journalistic practices of the time.47 
The proposal by Warren and Brandeis provided individuals the 
ability to censure the press and seek damages for the 
publication of truthful information. Critics of The Right to 
Privacy highlighted the direct conflict between the tort 
proposal that Warren and Brandeis positioned in the article 
and the First Amendment freedom of the press.48 Seeing this 
obstacle, Warren and Brandeis made an appeal to the 
judiciary, and not the legislature, imploring courts to extend 
the “right to be let alone” in tort actions. Additionally, Warren 
and Brandeis sought to address the freedom of the press issue 
by building in exceptions for the press. Specifically, Warren 
and Brandeis‟ proposition excluded from the privacy tort 
information published with a legitimate “public interest.” 
However, the acknowledgment by the authors that the First 
Amendment protections afforded to journalists would be a 
major factor in any cause of action based upon the right of 
privacy was overshadowed by their two-paged tirade chastising 
the press for its practices.49 
 
V. Establishing Privacy Torts 
 
The recognition of the right to privacy did not happen 
overnight. Warren and Brandeis‟ The Right to Privacy served 
only as the catalyst for discussion and provided authority upon 
which plaintiffs began to base their claims of invasion of 
privacy. The first case to cite to The Right to Privacy was 
Schuyler v. Curtis.50 This case involved the commission of a 
statue of the deceased philanthropist, Mary Hamilton 
 
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
47. It should be noted that Warren and Brandeis also discussed the 
appropriation of one‟s likeness for commercial use, however, it is obfuscated 
by the invasion by the press arguments put forth. 
48. See generally Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century 
Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (1990). 
49. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195-97 (tirade 
about yellow journalism). 
50. 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1891). 
11
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Schuyler, and her heirs‟ maintenance of a suit to enjoin the 
production, display, and advertisement of the statue.51 The 
defendants in the case contended that the injunction could not 
be granted because there was no injury to property to which 
damages could be awarded in a court of law.52 The court 
remarked: 
 
It is true that there is no reported decision which 
goes to this extent in maintaining the right of 
privacy, and in that respect this is a novel case. 
But the gradual extension of the law in the 
direction of affording the most complete redress 
for injury to individual rights makes this an easy 
step from reported decisions much similar in 
principle. In a recent article of the Harvard Law 
Review . . . entitled “The Right to Privacy,” we 
find an able summary of the extension and 
development of the law of individual rights, 
which well deserves and will repay the perusal of 
every lawyer.53 
 
Granting the injunction, the court held that the precedent, 
as cited and skillfully argued in The Right to Privacy, 
recognized the principle protected in each of the cases was the 
right to privacy.54 The decision in Schuyler was subsequently 
reversed on other grounds55 and did not serve well as precedent 
for the new right to privacy because the opinion failed to 
evaluate the cases and arguments provided by Warren and 
Brandeis. In the years following Schuyler, a host of courts 
considered the right to privacy but summarily dismissed the 
causes of actions for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.56 In addition to the cases, law review articles, 
 
51. Id. at 787. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 788. 
54. Id. 
55. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25-26 (N.Y. 1895). 
56. See Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) 
(refusing to enjoin biography of inventor on grounds he was public figure); 
Atkinson v. Doherty, 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) (rejecting privacy claim by 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/4
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comments, and notes were published discussing the essence of 
The Right to Privacy.57 It was not until 1902, in Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co.,58 that a court evaluated, in depth, 
the arguments presented by Warren and Brandeis. In 
Roberson, the New York Court of Appeals severely criticized 
Warren and Brandeis‟ stance and cautioned that the article, on 
its face, was incomplete and lacked any substantial 
precedent.59 To recognize the right of privacy as positioned by 
Warren and Brandeis, the court remarked, would be inviting 
“litigation bordering upon the absurd.”60 Indeed, the court 
warned: 
 
If such a principle be incorporated into the body 
of the law through the instrumentality of a court 
of equity, the attempts to logically apply the 
principle will necessarily result not only in a vast 
amount of litigation, . . . for the right of privacy, 
once established as a legal doctrine, cannot be 
confined to the restraint of the publication of a 
likeness, but must necessarily embrace as well 
 
widow of politician who objected to his likeness appearing on a cigar label on 
ground that public figures surrender privacy rights to the public); Murray v. 
Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (holding 
that parents cannot enjoin unauthorized publication of pictures of their 
children). 
57. See generally Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 NW. 
L. REV. 1 (1895); Augustus N. Hand, Schuyler Against Curtis and the Right to 
Privacy, 45 AM. L. REG. 745 (1897); Guy H. Thompson, The Right of Privacy 
as Recognized and Protected at Law and in Equity, 47 CENT. L.J. 148 (1898); 
The Right to Privacy, 4 MADRAS L.J. 17 (1894), reprinted in 6 GREEN BAG 498 
(1894); The Right to Privacy, 3 GREEN BAG 524 (1891); Recent Case, Atkinson 
v. Doherty, 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899), 13 HARV. L. REV. 415 (1900); Recent 
Case, Atkinson v. Doherty, 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899), 5 VA. L. REG. 709, 710-
12 (1900); Note, Development of the Law of Privacy, 8 HARV. L. REV. 280 
(1895); Note, Is This Libel?—More about Privacy, 7 HARV. L. REV. 492 (1894); 
Note, A New Phase of the Right to Privacy, 10 HARV. L. REV. 179 (1897); 
Comment, 2 NW. L. REV. 91 (1894); Note, The Right to Privacy, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 207 (1898); Note, The Right to Privacy—The Schuyler Injunction, 9 
HARV. L. REV. 354 (1896); Note, The Right to Privacy, 7 HARV. L. REV. 182 
(1894); Note, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 148 (1892); John Gilmer 
Speed, The Right of Privacy, THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, July 1896, at 64. 
58. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
59. Id. at 444-45. 
60. Id. at 443. 
13
2011] WARREN, BRANDEIS, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 159 
the publication of a word picture, a comment 
upon one‟s looks, conduct, domestic relations or 
habits. And, were the right of privacy once 
legally asserted, it would necessarily be held to 
include the same things if spoken instead of 
printed, for one, as well as the other, invades the 
right to be absolutely let alone.61 
 
The court remained steadfastly committed to traditional 
doctrines of requiring some physical or property injury and 
concluded that: “the so-called „right of privacy‟ has not as yet 
found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, 
the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence 
to settled principles of law by which the profession and the 
public have long been guided.”62 
The tides turned for the right to privacy when the New 
York legislature, in response to public outcry against the 
holding in Roberson, passed legislation that codified the cause 
of action alleged in Roberson.63 The legislation recognized as a 
tort the use of “another‟s name, portrait, or picture for 
commercial purposes without the subject‟s consent.”64 
Shortly thereafter, Georgia recognized a common law right 
of privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co,65when it refused to follow the decision in Roberson and 
unanimously endorsed the views of Warren and Brandeis 
espoused in The Right to Privacy. The Pavesich court found in 
favor of a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant insurance 
company violated his right to privacy when it used his name, 
portrait, and a fictitious testimonial in its newspaper 
advertisement without consent.66 The lack of precedent did not 
disturb the Pavesich court.67 In fact, what disturbed the court 
the most was the inflexibility of the judiciary to fashion legal 
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 447. 
63. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 48, at 717. 
64. Id. 
65. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
66. Id. at 79-80. 
67. Id. at 69. 
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remedies for novel situations.68 The Pavesich court condemned 
the decision in Roberson as “the result of an unconscious 
yielding to the feeling of conservatism which naturally arises in 
the mind of a judge who faces a proposition which is novel.”69 
The court stated that “this conservatism should not go to the 
extent of refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of 
nature prove to exist, and which nothing in judicial decision, 
legal history, or writings upon the law can be called to 
demonstrate its nonexistence as a legal right.”70 The court 
concluded: 
 
that the law recognizes, within proper limits, as 
a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the 
publication of one‟s picture without his consent 
by another as an advertisement, for the mere 
purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the 
advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we 
venture to predict that the day will come that the 
American bar will marvel that a contrary view 
was ever entertained by judges of eminence and 
ability . . . .71 
 
The Pavesich court‟s predictions were soon materialized. 
By 1939, the privacy torts were recognized in the American 
Law Institute‟s Restatement (First) of Torts.72 The right to 
privacy, as codified by the Restatement, read “[a] person who 
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another‟s interest 
in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness 
exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”73 In 1960, William 
Prosser commented on The Right to Privacy.74 By that time a 
majority of the states had responded to Warren and Brandeis‟ 
article and recognized a common law right to privacy.75 In his 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 78. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 81. 
72. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
73. Id. 
74. Prosser, supra note 33. 
75. Id. at 386-88. 
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note, Prosser evaluated over 300 cases involving privacy issues 
and outlined four distinct types of invasion of privacy that had 
been recognized by the courts.76 These “invasions of privacy” 
formed the basis for the privacy torts listed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.77 The privacy torts are: (1) intrusion upon 
seclusion;78 (2) public disclosure of private facts;79 (3) false light 
or “publicity”;80 and (4) appropriation.81 These torts continue to 
be recognized today and are an integral part of American 
jurisprudence. However, technological developments 
necessitate revisiting whether privacy concerns are different 
and whether tort law needs to evolve to protect those concerns. 
As Warren and Brandeis noted, privacy must be evaluated 
in light of the “modern enterprise and inventions.”82 In the age 
of technology, “the continuing expansion of privacy rights may 
be more important than ever. Indeed, computer age technology 
 
76. Id. at 388-89. 
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977). 
78. “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. § 652B. 
79.  
 One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private 
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public. 
 
Id. § 652D. 
80.  
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that 
places the other before the public in a false light is subject 
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the 
false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity 
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the 
other would be placed. 
 
Id. § 652E. 
81. “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness 
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.” Id. § 
652C. 
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196. 
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threatens privacy in ways that Warren and Brandeis could not 
possibly have imagined.”83 Privacy law, however, has failed to 
keep pace with technology. Modern day courts, like those in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, continue to apply 
traditional laws to novel situations, rather than expanding the 
laws to address the new problem. As such, there has been 
much debate about what constitutes privacy.84 Technology has 
enabled the collection of an astounding amount of personal 
data online. Subsequently, the privacy debate has continued 
and now includes a plea for an individual‟s right to privacy 
online. Devotees of the fundamental arguments made by 
Warren and Brandeis suggest that “the right to be let alone” 
should include a right to “information privacy” online.85 
Advocates of privacy describe information privacy as “the 
desire of individuals to limit the kinds of information that 
others know about them.”86 The novel situation that presents 
itself today is the protection and usage of information shared 
across social networks. 
 
VI. The Right to Privacy in Social Networking: A Plea for 
Privacy in the Midst of Constant Disclosure of Personal 
Identifiable Information 
 
Mostly everyone utilizes a social network. Facebook boasts 
500 million members,87 while MySpace and Twitter claim 125 
 
83. Kramer, supra note 48. 
84. Noted privacy scholar Daniel J. Solove, in the article A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006), argues for a new taxonomy for privacy 
to aid the judiciary and lawmakers‟ understanding of privacy violations. 
Solove undertakes great efforts to fully evaluate all sources of privacy law 
and develop a taxonomy that focuses more on the various activities that 
encroach on privacy rather than merely focusing on the poorly defined term 
“privacy.” Id. 
85. GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30322, ONLINE 
PRIVACY PROTECTION: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 5 (2001). 
86. Comment, Steven C. Carlson & Ernest D. Miller, Public Data and 
Personal Privacy, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 83, 87 (2000) 
(noting that information privacy is one kind of privacy interest that 
individuals possess). 
87. Mark Zuckerberg, 500 Million Stories, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 21, 
2010), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=409753352130. 
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and 105 million members, respectively.88 Users share personal 
information, pictures, and comments with their friends and 
followers and post status updates which provide up-to-the-
minute details about their daily activity. Users can even play 
interactive games with one another.89 Social networks have 
grown at record rates based on the ability to connect and/or 
reconnect. “Boy F[ace]B[ook] has just about everybody on here. 
From the girl who helped them steal the original BJ (my 
truck), to people I‟ve known since 2nd grade, to my Aunt 
Jean!”90 This status update captures the very essence of the 
popularity of social networks. Whether it is Facebook, 
MySpace, or Twitter, social networks have become 
commonplace. Also typical are headlines like Sites Confront 
Privacy Loopholes,91 Facebook Announces Changes to its 
Privacy Policy,92 and Do Social Networks Bring the End of 
Privacy?93 These headlines are demonstrative of the dilemma 
created by social networks. Daniel Solove, noted privacy 
scholar, commented that the idea that society has abandoned 
privacy in light of its willingness to share personal information 
is “wrongheaded at best. It is still possible to protect privacy, 
but doing so requires that we rethink outdated understandings 
of the concept.”94 However, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 
offered comments which suggest the very opposite. Zuckerberg 
contended that society‟s willingness to share has created an 
environment where privacy concerns are less important to 
users of social networks today than they were when social 
networking began. Justifying the decision to change its privacy 
 
88. Kenneth Lee, October 2010 Facebook, Twitter, MySpace Statistics, 
MRDEFINITE.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://mrdefinite.com/facebook-twitter-
myspace-statistics-october-2010/. 
89. Facebook offers interactive games such as “Sorority Life” and “Mafia 
Wars” where users of Facebook battle each other to gain “Glam” or “Don” 
status. 
90. Kamilah Hall Sharp, Kamilah Hall Sharp, FACEBOOK (Aug. 6, 2010, 
10:00PM), http://www.facebook.com/Kamilahmh. 
91. Steel & Vascellaro, supra note 6. 
92. Geriné Tcholakian, Facebook Announces Changes to Its Privacy 
Policy, MEDIA IN CANADA (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://www.mediaincanada.com/articles/mic/20090827/facebookprivacy.html. 
93. Daniel J. Solove, Do Social Networks Bring the End of Privacy?, SCI. 
AM., Sept. 1, 2008, at 101. 
94. Id. at 104. 
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policy in December 2009,95 Zuckerberg provided the following 
comments: 
 
When I got started in my dorm room at Harvard, 
the question a lot of people asked was “why 
would I want to put any information on the 
Internet at all? Why would I want to have a 
website?” And then in the last [five] or [six] 
years, blogging has taken off in a huge way and 
all these different services that have people 
sharing all this information. People have really 
gotten comfortable not only sharing more 
information and different kinds, but more openly 
and with more people. That social norm is just 
something that has evolved over time. We view it 
as our role in the system to constantly be 
innovating and be updating what our system is 
to reflect what the current social norms are. A lot 
of companies would be trapped by the 
conventions and their legacies of what they‟ve 
built, doing a privacy change—doing a privacy 
change for 350 million users is not the kind of 
thing that a lot of companies would do. But we 
viewed that as a really important thing, to 
always keep a beginner‟s mind and what would 
we do if we were starting the company now and 
we decided that these would be the social norms 
now and we just went for it.96 
 
These comments are illustrative of the social networking 
site‟s position that societal norms have changed such that 
privacy is no longer paramount to users. These comments are 
dubious at best. Many of the changes to Facebook‟s privacy 
 
95. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Asks More Than 350 Million 
Users Around the World to Personalize Their Privacy (Dec. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=133917. 
96. Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook‟s Zuckerberg says the Age of Privacy 
is Over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010), 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_o
f_privacy_is_ov.php. 
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policy can be attributed to Facebook‟s endeavor to “turn that 
vast amount of data into a multi-billion dollar ad[vertising]-
business.”97 While no social network provider has outwardly 
expressed their desire to capitalize on the data it collects from 
its network‟s users, social networking sites nonetheless 
inundate users with advertisements from the moment they log 
onto the site. 
The business of tracking, aggregating, and selling personal 
information is not a new concept. However, with advances in 
technology, social networks have created a platform where data 
is collected in two ways: from the users directly and from 
tracking the users‟ movements online. Tracking, coupled with 
the openness to share personal information through social 
networking, and the ever-changing policies with respect to 
what a user can or cannot designate as private, has created a 
lack of control of personal information and uninformed consent 
to various uses of personal information.98 Social networks 
espouse the belief that their privacy policies, privacy settings, 
and terms and conditions constitute sufficient notice of their 
practices and consent from its users. 
Social networking sites provide, through links generally 
found at the bottom of the sites, their terms and conditions and 
privacy policies. Most social network sites give users the ability 
to control how their information is shared amongst users. For 
example, Facebook‟s privacy policy99 and MySpace‟s privacy 
policy100 both contain options such as allowing users to choose 
who can view their profile, find them in a search, or see their 
personal information, like birthday, phone number, and 
address. Indeed, a 2010 Pew Report on social networks and 
reputation management showed that two-thirds of all social 
network users (65 percent) have used the privacy settings 
 
97. Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Grapples with Privacy Issues, WALL 
ST. J., May 19, 2010, at B1. 
98. See, e.g., Facebook‟s Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (Section 8 
states: “We cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will not 
become publicly available.”). 
99. Id. 
100. MySpace Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy (last visited Oct. 
14, 2010). 
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provided by the social networks and have changed the privacy 
settings to limit what they share with others online.101 While 
Facebook and MySpace have policies that seemingly allow 
users control of their personal information, Twitter explains 
that its network “asks „what‟s happening‟ and makes the 
answer spread across the globe to millions, immediately,”102 
and has a slightly different take on privacy. Twitter‟s privacy 
policy specifically states: “Our Services are primarily designed 
to help you share information with the world. Most of the 
information you provide to us is information you are asking us 
to make public.”103 
Twitter‟s approach to privacy can be attributed to the way 
in which Twitter differs from social networking sites like 
Facebook and MySpace. Twitter is a blogging site that allows 
users to share messages of 140 characters in length. While 
Twitter allows users to share messages with their “followers,” 
the default privacy setting on Twitter is that all messages 
posted using the site are public and available to any user of 
Twitter.104 Thus, the information that is being shared 
seemingly is limited to the tweets posted by the users.105 
Twitter has not been immune from privacy issues. An article on 
Techcrunch.com, Privacy Disaster at Twitter: Directed Message 
Exposed,106 provided a detailed account of a user whose private 
messages between a friend was posted to her normal Twitter 
blog and publicized to all 650 of her followers.107 Most recently, 
 
101. MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, REPUTATION 
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 21 (2010), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.aspx. 
102. TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
103. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/privacy (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
104. Id. The profile information on Twitter is not robust. Only name, 
location, website, number of tweets, followers, and followings are shared with 
viewers of the site. 
105. The tweets by users often disclose personal information, such as 
vacation plans, the whereabouts of the user, and other information that could 
subject the user to crimes such as identity theft. See, e.g., infra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
106. Michael Arrington, Privacy Disaster at Twitter: Direct Messages 
Exposed, TECHCRUNCH.COM, http://techcrunch.com/2008/04/23/privacy-
disaster-at-twitter-direct-messages-exposed (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
107. This unintended publication of private “tweets” was attributed to 
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Twitter has come under fire for its failure to provide adequate 
security measures for the protection of personal information 
collected from its users.108 In mid-2009, hackers of Twitter‟s 
network were able to gain access to many users‟ email 
addresses and other private user information, gain access to 
user messages, reset user passwords, and send phony tweets 
from user accounts.109 While the information that is made 
public by Twitter provides a limited amount of personal 
information, privacy is still an issue with the network. Indeed, 
accounts such as the one exposed on TechCrunch.com, the 
hacking incident, and a report that a Twitter user‟s home was 
robbed after tweeting about his vacation,110 indicates that 
privacy is a major issue even when limited information can be 
outwardly viewed. 
Simply stated, users do not have control over use of their 
information.111 The Wall Street Journal reported that several 
social-networking sites released data to advertising companies 
that could potentially enable advertisers to easily acquire 
names and other personal details about their users, despite 
policies that indicate this information would not be disclosed 
without consent.112 Social networking sites inadvertently 
provided click-through data to advertisers that include user 
 
problems caused by the third party application “GroupTweet,” but have been 
addressed by the founder of the application by disabling new registrations 
until the problems are fixed. Id. 
108. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm‟n, Twitter Settles Charges that it 
Failed to Protect Consumers‟ Personal Information; Company Will Establish 
Independently Audited Information Security Program (June 24, 2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm. In the first of its 
kind case against an online social networking site, the FTC reached a 
settlement with Twitter in response to the site‟s failure to take proper 
precautions to protect its users‟ information from hackers. Id. The terms of 
the settlement bar Twitter from misleading consumers about its privacy 
policies for 20 years and require the company to establish and maintain a 
comprehensive information security program that is to be assessed every 
other year for the next 10 years. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Man‟s House Robbed after Tweeting Vacation, ABC KGO-TV SAN 
FRANCISCO (May 29, 2009), 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/technology&id=6839323. 
111. Secondary use of information relates directly to how the social 
networking site utilizes the information collected about its users. 
112. Steel & Vascellaro, supra note 6. 
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names.113 This data is capable of enabling advertisers to direct 
back to the user‟s profile page which contains other personal 
information like name, address, phone number, and email 
address.114 These incidences clearly indicate not only a lack of 
control by users over whether their information is knowingly 
made public or disclosed to third parties, but also a lack of 
control by operators of the various social networking sites. In a 
prepared statement for presentation to Congress,115 Marc 
Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, remarked: 
 
I have listened to Facebook experts discuss the 
privacy settings who quickly became confused. I 
even heard Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg 
describe the new changes to his company‟s 
privacy settings only to learn, unexpectedly, that 
some of his college photos were now available to 
“everyone.” 
 
I am convinced that not even Facebook 
understands how its own privacy settings 
operate. And if Facebook cannot understand the 
privacy settings, how can the users?116 
 
As more and more social networks develop and the number 
of individuals utilizing the various services increases at record 
speeds, the possibility that social networks could supplant 
other forms of media is real. This potential is frightening to 
advocates of privacy and should be frightening to users. The 
personal information disclosed by users of social networks on 
posts and profiles, coupled with the data collected electronically 
from the users‟ actions and interactions with online networks, 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Online Privacy, Social Networking and Crime Victimization: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Rotenberg 
Testimony] (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic 
Privacy Information Center). 
116. Id. 
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creates a rich profile that can be exploited. What is even more 
troubling is the change of privacy policies, which often occur 
after users have disclosed personal information. These “bait 
and switch” tactics employed by social networking have 
resulted in user confusion as to what information is accessible 
to the public, thus exposing them to unnecessary risk of harm. 
For example, an anonymous blogger, “Harriet Jacobs,” revealed 
that her abusive ex-husband obtained her current location and 
workplace because Google Buzz created automated lists from 
email contacts without first getting subscriber consent.117 
Individuals have reported being “outed” by unauthorized access 
to Facebook pages where photographs designated as private 
were made public.118 And, in one incident, a professor at the 
University of Texas was able to discern an individual‟s political 
affiliation simply by looking at the individual‟s profile and 
friend list.119 “[S]ocial network sites [have] create[d] the 
illusion of limited publication and control, but there is no 
technological mechanism for users to effectuate that control, 
nor law that recognizes those decisions.”120 
At this juncture, it is imperative that we take a new look 
at privacy and its protection online, in particular, privacy as it 
relates to social networking. Warren and Brandeis asserted in 
The Right to Privacy that individuals have the right to 
determine, “ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”121 
This assertion is as valid, and as relevant as it was in 1890. 
 
117. Harriet Jacobs, Fuck You, Google, FUGITIVUS (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://fugitivus.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/fuck-you-google/. 
118. Carter Jerigan & Behram F.T. Mistree, Gaydar: Facebook 
Friendships Expose Sexual Orientation, FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 5, 2009), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2611/2
302. See also Carolyn Y. Johnson, Project „Gaydar‟, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 
2009, at K1; Steve Lohr, How Privacy Can Vanish Online, a Bit at a Time, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1. 
119. Jack Lindamood et al, Inferring Private Information Using Social 
Network Data, PROC. OF THE 18TH INT‟L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 1145 (2009), 
available at http://www2009.org/proceedings/pdf/p1145.pdf. 
120. Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech and “Blurry-Edged” Social 
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1341 (2009) (arguing that technology controls 
may be the best solution to express social network users‟ privacy wishes on 
information that may be posted). 
121. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198. 
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Indeed, users of social networking sites share openly with their 
friends and followers their thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
with an understanding, based upon the policy presented at the 
time of their disclosure, that the information would only be 
shared with those selected. 
Arguably, users who are uncomfortable with a particular 
social network provider‟s privacy policy could stop using the 
services and delete their profile. However, discontinuing use of 
the services does not eliminate the problem. The problem 
remains that the social networking website has the ability to 
continue to use and/or capitalize on information previously 
acquired by virtue of use of its services. Moreover, it is 
extremely difficult to delete your online persona and reclaim 
your information from social network sites, so much so that 
websites like Web 2.0 Suicide Machine have evolved to help 
users reclaim their privacy online.122 
Conventional laws and regulations do not sufficiently 
address the privacy issues associated with social network sites. 
Contract law provides little relief to social network users. 
Privacy policies and terms of use generally provide the basis for 
such breach of contract claims. However social networking sites 
routinely change privacy policies and terms of use to suit their 
needs. Having learned lessons from previous cases invalidating 
terms of use of online,123 social networking sites provide notice 
of changes and have crafted changes to avoid the results in 
previous cases.124 Of the privacy torts, positioned by Warren 
and Brandeis and later more concretely outlined by Prosser, 
public disclosure of private facts seemingly provides a remedy 
for social network users. However, it is hard to establish that 
the facts are private when a user has voluntarily posted them 
on a social networking site and many terms and conditions give 
the social networking site control to use the information. 
 
122. WEB 2.0 SUICIDE MACHINE, http://suicidemachine.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2010). 
123. See, e.g., Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 
2009); Specht v. Netscape Commc‟ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
124. Chris Kelley, Improving Sharing Through Control, Simplicity and 
Connection, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 8, 2009), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=101470352130. 
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Indeed, a jury in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group,125 a 
case involving employees who were terminated based upon a 
post to a group, Spec-Tator on MySpace, rejected plaintiffs‟ 
privacy claims, explaining that while the Spec-Tator was “a 
place of solitude and seclusion which was designed to protect 
the Plaintiffs‟ private affairs and concerns[,]” they did not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the MySpace group.126 In 
addition to this case, Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel 
Incorporated,127 further affirms the view held by many, that 
once information is posted on a social network, it is public 
information. In Moreno, the court ruled that there were no 
private facts at issue with the publication of a post by Cynthia 
Moreno bashing her hometown because “[a] matter that is 
already public or that has previously become part of the public 
domain is not private.”128 The court commented that there 
could be no reasonable expectation that the information would 
remain private and found that “the fact that Cynthia expected 
a limited audience does not change the above analysis. By 
posting the article on MySpace, Cynthia opened the article to 
the public at large. Her potential audience was vast.”129 
 Recognizing the deficiencies of conventional laws, privacy 
advocates have petitioned the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) to investigate social network sites for their policies.130 
Privacy advocates believe that, at the very least, the practices 
of social networks constitute unfair trade practices. The FTC 
has acknowledged the privacy issues created by social networks 
and, as a result, has instituted several actions against social 
networks.131 However, the actions by the FTC fall short of 
 
125. No. 06-5754(FSH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *4 (D.N.J. 
July 24, 2008). 
126. Jury Verdict Sheet, Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, No. 06-
5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, (D.N.J. July 24, 2008), ECF No. 61. 
127. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
128. Id. at 862. 
129. Id. at 863. 
130. See Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc., Fed. Trade. Comm‟n (Dec. 17, 
2009), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-
preview.aspx?doc_id=19659893 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
131. Complaint, In re Twitter, Inc., No. 092 3093, Fed. Trade. Comm‟n 
(June 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/100624twittercmpt.pdf; In re Google 
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establishing guidelines or rules for the industry as a whole. 
The actions of the FTC have been independent and the findings 
and remedies implemented have been specific to the particular 
social network. 
Data breach laws, enacted by forty-six states and the 
District of Columbia132 as a result of the February 2005 
security breach at one of the nation‟s largest data aggregators 
and resellers, ChoicePoint, also do not provide a viable redress 
of harm for social network users. These laws generally focus on 
informing consumers of a security breach when their data is 
lost or compromised.133 Generally, these laws contain four main 
components: (1) a definition of personal identifiable 
information; (2) notification of any unauthorized access to 
personal identifiable information; (3) notification procedures; 
and (4) notification timelines.134 These laws are of no assistance 
to users of social networks because the information that may be 
acquired from social networking sites does not ordinarily fit the 
definition of personal identifiable information. Generally, these 
statutes describe personal identifiable information as an 
individual‟s name in combination with another identifier, such 
as a social security number or credit card number with an 
access code or password. 135 While some user names may 
consist of legal names, there is no direct access to a site 
member‟s social security number or other similar personal 
information. Moreover, social network sites would only be 
required to notify its users if there is a reasonable belief that 
personal identifiable data has been acquired by an 
 
Buzz, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/googlebuzz/default.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2010); In re Facebook, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/ 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010); In re Facebook II, EPIC, 
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/in_re_facebook_ii (last visited Oct. 22, 2010); 
Facebook Privacy, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/ (last visited Oct. 22, 
2010). 
132. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
133. States Offer Data Breach Protection, NAT‟L ASS‟N OF ATT‟YS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/states-offer-data-breach-protection.php (last visited Oct. 
22, 2010). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
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unauthorized person.136 Even if information on social networks 
were considered personal identifiable information under the 
applicable law, the third party accessing the information would 
not be unauthorized since the network permitted such access. 
For example, see Facebook‟s137 and MySpace‟s138 privacy 
policies. Because the disclosure of information on social 
networks does not fall under either of the first two components 
of states‟ data breach notification laws, notification procedures 
and timelines which describe how and when affected 
individuals should be notified in case of a data breach simply 
do not apply. 
Federal laws regulating the collection of personal 
information provide limited to no help in addressing privacy 
issues with social networks.139 The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act,140 which addresses computer hacking and federal 
computer crimes, is wholly inapplicable to social networking 
sites. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 
136. Id. 
137. “In order to provide you with useful social experiences off of 
Facebook, we occasionally need to provide General Information about you to 
pre-approved third party websites and applications that use Platform at the 
time you visit them (if you are still logged in to Facebook).” Facebook‟s 
Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2010). 
138.  
Some of the advertisements that appear on MySpace 
Services may also be delivered to you by third party 
Internet advertising companies. These companies utilize 
certain technologies to deliver advertisements and 
marketing messages and to collect non-PII about your visit 
to or use of MySpace Services, including information about 
the ads they display, via a cookie placed on your computer 
that reads your IP address. 
 
MySpace Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy (last visited Oct. 
17, 2010). 
139. The Video Privacy Protection Act which prevents the disclosure of 
one‟s video rentals provided success in disclosure challenges in Lane v. 
Facebook, Inc., No. C 08-3845 RS, 2009 WL 3458198, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 
2009) and Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp.2d 396, 397 (N.D. Tex. 
2009). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
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(HIPAA),141 which applies to individually identifiable health 
information, does not apply to the type of information that is 
disclosed and collected. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act142 is also 
a dead-end for social network privacy since it only applies to 
actions by financial institutions and was enacted to regulate 
the disclosure of private, personally identifiable financial 
information that is disclosed to non-affiliated third parties. The 
Children‟s Online Privacy Protection Act,143 which outlines 
rules that persons or entities under U.S. jurisdiction must 
follow when collecting personal information online from 
children under 13 years of age, illustrates a concern for the 
collection of personal information online, however, social 
networks do not fall within the threshold concern of this act—
they are not targeted at children. These laws were narrowly 
tailored to address limited amounts of information to which 
Congress found that there was a compelling need to regulate. 
Privacy and social networks have sparked Congressional 
interest.144 Congress, recognizing the impact of social 
networking, held hearings on July 28, 2010. These hearings, 
while a major step for privacy advocates, focused primarily on 
identifying the potential harms of social networking in an effort 
to determine whether there is a governmental interest in 
regulating social networks or whether the current self-
regulatory regime is sufficient. It is apparent that the only way 
to combat the attitudes of social networking sites with respect 
to user privacy and information disclosure is for the courts to 
firmly articulate a rule of privacy for social networking and 
extend existing concepts in the common law to secure privacy 
protection for social network users. Indeed, “[p]olitical, social 
and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights and 
the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the 
 
141. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.). 
142. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006). 
144. See generally Online Privacy, Social Networking and Crime 
Victimization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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demands of society.”145 
 
VII.  Grounding Social Networking Privacy 
 
There are many differing views on the meaning of 
“privacy.”146 Indeed, privacy is a concept that is quite elusive 
and has been the subject of much debate by academics. “[E]ven 
the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must confess 
that there are serious problems of defining the essence and 
scope of this right.”147 In order to fully develop protection for 
information privacy for social networks, it is necessary to start 
with a clear articulation of the essence and scope of the right 
that is being protected. One view is that privacy requires an 
attempt to maintain secrecy of the information—once 
information is revealed to others, it is no longer private.148 This 
notion of privacy is wholly inappropriate for social networks 
and arguably for privacy in general. Social network theorists 
have studied the relevance of relationships and the flow of 
information within an individual‟s social network for 
decades.149 Indeed, the network theory150 has been used to 
reconcile differing outcomes in privacy cases where the 
information was disclosed by the plaintiff to others.151 The use 
 
145. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 193. 
146. See, e.g., ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 
(1970); Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and 
Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2000); William M. 
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
253 (1966); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, 
News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Charles 
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavinson, Privacy and the 
Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological 
Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307 (1966); Robert C. Post, 
Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001). 
147. Beaney, supra note 146, at 255. 
148. See, e.g., Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993); Fisher v. Ohio Dep‟t of Rehab. and Corr., 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 303 
(Ct. Cl. 1988). 
149. See, e.g., Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. 
SOC. 1360 (1973). 
150. Network theory describes how information flows between groups of 
individuals. 
151. Lior Jacob Strahilevits, A Social Network Theory of Privacy, 72 U. 
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of network theory principles in determining whether a privacy 
interest exists in information that has been previously 
disclosed was highlighted by Lior Strahilevitz in A Social 
Networks Theory of Privacy.152 Strahilevitz proposed that, 
rather than looking to the number of individuals to which 
information is disclosed, the legal analysis to determine 
whether a privacy interest exists in information after a 
disclosure should be “what the parties should have expected to 
follow the initial disclosure of information by someone other 
than the defendant.”153 In other words, information should be 
deemed private if the information stays confined to the initial 
group to which it was disclosed, even if such group is rather 
large.154 While this approach to privacy has been viewed as 
highly contextual, requiring courts to understand sociology 
concepts, privacy, as it relates to social networking, is complex 
and requires a more nuanced analysis. Users of social network 
systems understand that “personal information is routinely 
shared with countless others, and they also know that they 
leave a trail of data wherever they go.”155 In addition to this 
understanding, users are conscientious about the types of 
sensitive information they share through social networking. 
Such awareness has been demonstrated by the absence of 
credit card information and social security numbers disclosed 
by users of social networks.156 Comments made by the founder 
 
CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 988. 
154. The idea of a requirement of complete secrecy of information has 
been generally rejected in contemporary privacy cases. See, e.g., Times Mirror 
Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988); Multimedia WMAZ, 
Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of 
St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Indeed the standard developed 
in many of these cases is not how many people the information was disclosed 
to but rather the relation of those persons to the plaintiff and what the 
plaintiff reasonably expected those persons to do with the information. See 
generally id. 
155. Solove, supra note 93, at 104. 
156. Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, commented: “I have never seen anyone put a credit card 
number or an SSN on his or her wall” in his testimony during congressional 
hearings on online privacy and social networking. Rotenberg Testimony, 
supra note 115, at 3. 
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of Facebook provide insight to social networks‟ views on 
privacy. The view held by social networks is that privacy law 
and policy should focus on the current expectations of privacy, 
such as the perception that financial information and social 
security numbers are private and should not be shared within 
social networks. Indeed, from the social network standpoint, 
sufficient laws exist to protect this sensitive information.157 It 
is true that, for a number of years, the federal government has 
enacted statutes which serve to protect sensitive personal 
information from disclosure. As Solove has commented, 
however, to view privacy as solely the measure of a societal 
view of what has been considered and what is considered 
private at any given point in time, does nothing more than 
“provide a status report on existing privacy norms.”158 Privacy 
is a much broader concept which includes many of the views 
espoused by privacy scholars.159 
Applying to social networks the network theory of privacy 
is appropriate. It requires nothing more than for courts to 
embrace the concept that absolute silence is not necessary to 
maintain privacy. Under this theory, individuals may disclose 
information on a social network provided that parameters on 
access are placed on the information shared. When an 
individual limits access to the information shared on a social 
network, the individual‟s right to privacy in that information 
would not be extinguished.160 For example, in Pietrylo v. 
 
157. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 554-
558 (2006); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 
(2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693, 1693m (2006); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); Video 
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006); Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2006). 
158. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1142 (2002). 
159. In his article, Conceptualizing Privacy, Solove studies the 
conceptions legal scholars, philosophers, psychologists, jurists, and 
sociologists have of privacy. See generally Id. From his studies, Solove 
determines that each group‟s theories are too extreme—focusing on one or 
more core characteristics of privacy. Id. He puts forth the idea that privacy is 
better conceived if it is viewed as drawing from a common pool of similar 
characteristics. Id. 
160. This argument is based upon the current available technology and 
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Hillstone Restaurant Group, membership to the group was 
limited.161 The group was monitored by its owners. Under the 
network theory of privacy, the owners of the group and its 
users would maintain a privacy expectation in the posts to the 
designated group.162 Indeed, in Pietrylo, the restaurant 
manager had to acquire access information from a user that 
had been admitted into the group.163 Courts would not have to 
consider the number of users, but whether privacy settings 
were used to exclude those outside of the network. 
Having determined, under the network theory, that a user 
maintains a privacy interest, even when personal information 
is disclosed on a network of users, “[i]t remains to consider 
what are the limitations of this right to [social network] privacy 
and what remedies may be granted for the enforcement of the 
right.”164 Once an individual has established privacy settings 
and parameters for his network, a user must opt-in to changes 
by the social network that would make any information that 
was previously restricted by the user public. The failure to 
obtain permission and subsequent disclosure of this 
information would constitute a “legal injuria.” The elements for 
redress already exist in the public disclosure of private facts 
tort. A simple expansion of this tort to encompass disclosure of 
information shared on a social network contrary to the privacy 
settings would provide a suitable remedy to protect the privacy 
interests of information posted on social networks. “If the 
invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for 
demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental 
suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a 
basis for compensation.”165 The public disclosure of private 
facts torts is defined as: 
 
 
embraces the technological solutions put forth by Lauren Gelman. See 
Gelman, supra note 120. 
161. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at 
*1-2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at *2-3. The facts of the case seem to suggest that the individual 
was coerced by management to disclose her user password. 
164. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214. 
165. Id. at 213. 
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One who gives publicity to a matter concerning 
the private life of another is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public;166 
 
An extension of the tort to include “or (c) discloses information 
that has previously been restricted from public views on social 
networks” would provide the necessary remedy. 
“In determining the scope of this new rule, aid would be 
afforded by” looking to the limitations of the technology.167 If 
individuals are incapable of excluding information from the 
public by virtue of the available technology, then the 
individual‟s reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished. 
This limitation at first glance may provide an incentive to 
social network sites to rid themselves of the various privacy 
settings that they currently use. However, the term “excluding 
information from public view” is a broad concept that 
encapsulates the ability to select who may enter your network. 
 
VIII. Conclusion168 
 
“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to 
the next steps which must be taken for the protection of the 
person and for securing to the individual”169 the right to control 
the disclosure of personal information provided in securing 
access to social networking technology. “For years there has 
been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the 
unauthorized”170 disclosure of personal identifiable 
information. “The alleged facts of a somewhat notorious case”171 
 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
167. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214. 
168. This section of the Article contains many direct quotes from Warren 
and Brandeis which simply substitute current technology where the 
photography was discussed. 
169. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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brought to light in 2004172 laid the foundation for the 
functioning yet altogether useless state of security breach 
laws.173 “Of the desirability—indeed of the necessity—of some 
such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt.”174 The 
growing amount of personal information that is collected and 
shared using social networking sites and the number of third-
party advertisers with access to this information requires an 
evaluation of the privacy rules that apply. Indeed, the sole 
purpose of this Article is to consider “whether the existing law 
affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the 
privacy of the individual” personal information disclosed on 
social networking sites; and, “if it does, what the nature and 
extent of such protection is.”175 Information privacy “is the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.”176 “It is certain every man 
has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases. He has 
certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or 
commit them only to the sight of his friends.”177 “[A]nd even if 
he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the 
power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given 
them.”178 
Warren and Brandeis would argue for a “right to privacy” 
 
172. Financial records of more than 163,000 consumers held in a 
database owned by Choicepoint was compromised in a data breach attributed 
to the lack of proper security and record handling procedures. Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm‟n, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to 
Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 
2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm. See also 
Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Assoc. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr,, & 
Daniel J. Solove, Assoc. Professor, George Washington Univ. Law Sch., to 
Fed. Trade Comm‟n (Dec. 16, 2004), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/fcraltr12.16.04.html. 
173. Fred Cate, Another Notice Isn‟t Answer, USA TODAY, Feb 28, 2005, 
at 14A. 
174. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196. 
175. Id. at 197. 
176. ALLEN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967), quoted in FRED H. 
CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 22 (1997). 
177. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198 n.2 (quoting Millar v. 
Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769) (Yates, J.)). 
178. Id. at 198. 
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for social networks. They would make the claim that 
technology has created a need to revisit privacy protection. 
While users of social networks are willing to share information, 
they should nonetheless retain the right to limit information 
shared to their intended audience. Indeed, Warren and 
Brandeis would argue that courts should view the disclosure 
and commercialization of personal information contrary to the 
wishes of the users as a legal injuria and that privacy cannot 
be left in the hands of those who seek to diminish it. Warren 
and Brandies would demand secretum pro amicabiliter 
promptum!179 
 
 
179. Roughly translated to mean “Privacy for Social Networks Now.” 
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